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CHAPTER 16 
Labor Relations 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
The most important development in Massachusetts labor law during 
the survey year was not the result of any decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court or any act of the Massachusetts legislature. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Garner 
case narrowed the jurisdiction of state courts in respect to issuing in-
junctions in certain labor disputes. On the other hand, the adoption 
of new jurisdictional standards by the National Labor Relations Board 
removed many small employers from federal regulation of their labor 
relations. These two developments in federal law thus create a Janus-
like situation under which the area of state action in labor disputes is 
contracted in one sphere and expanded in another. 
A. FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION 
§16.1. Before the Garner case. When the National Labor Relations 
Act (Wagner Act) was passed in 1935 it regulated only conduct by an 
employer. In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act amended the Wagner Act by 
adding, as unfair labor practices, certain union acts, such as picketing 
which constitutes a secondary boycott. For several years it was gen-
erally believed that when an employer was faced with union conduct 
which violated both the Taft-Hartley Act and Massachusetts law he 
had a choice of remedies: he could file an unfair labor practice charge 
with the National Labor Relations Board, as a result of which the 
Board could proceed to have the conduct enjoined in the federal courts, 
or he could file his own bill in equity for injunctive relief in the 
Superior Court of Massachusetts. This approach was based on the 
theory, now overturned by the Supreme Court, that the federal statute 
was designed to enforce public rights, whereas the state court action was 
a remedy for enforcing the private tort rights of the individual em-
ployer. 
Although the Supreme Court 1 ruled in 1949 that a state could not 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the law firm of Morgan. Brown & Kearns, 
Boston. He is the coauthor (with Donald A. Shaw) of Labor Relations Guide for 
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§16.1. 1 International Union. USW (AFL). Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Board. 336 U.S. 245. 69 Sup. Ct. 516. 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949). 
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§16.2 LABOR RELATIONS 171 
abridge the rights of employees to self-organization and collective bar-
gaining guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA, the idea of concurrent 
jurisdiction so far as a state proscribing union conduct also violative of 
the federal act was still prevalent in 1950 when the Cox-Phillips Act 2 
was enacted by the Massachusetts legislature. This law defined what 
were to be lawful and unlawful labor disputes in Massachusetts; and 
the unions, employer associations, professors, and legislators vitally 
concerned with this law all assumed that they were dealing with labor 
disputes affecting interstate as well as intrastate commerce. The statute 
itself shows evidence of this thinking since it includes, as unlawful 
labor disputes, controversies over a demand that an employer commit 
"an unfair labor practice either in violation of chapter one hundred 
and fifty A [the Massachusetts Labor Relations Act], or in violation of 
the National Labor Relations Act," 3 and controversies over a demand 
that an employer recognize one union if another union has been certi-
fied by the State Labor Relations Commission "or by the National 
Labor Relations Board." 4 
But union lawyers were not asleep. They began to think of the 
doctrine of federal supremacy. While labor leaders were denouncing 
the Taft-Hartley Act as a "slave labor law," their lawyers began to argue 
before various state courts in labor dispute cases that enactment of the 
Taft-Hartley Act had pre-empted the labor law field and that state 
courts were therefore without jurisdiction to enjoin union conduct. 
Their efforts were crowned with notable success in the Garner case. 
§16.2. The Garner case. In Garnerl the lower court in Pennsyl-
vania had enjoined peaceful picketing which it found was for the pur-
pose of coercing the employer into compelling his employees to join the 
union, such coercion being a violation of both Pennsylvania law and 
the Taft-Hartley Act. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed 
the lower court on the ground that the Taft-Hartley Act had pre-
empted the field. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court of the 
United States unanimously approved the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania. 
It is clear from the decision that a state court may not enjoin peaceful 
picketing which is violative of the NLRA, and hence within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, such as secondary boycotts, jurisdic-
tional disputes, and at least some types of recognition picketing - for 
example, picketing by one union when another union has been certified 
and picketing to force the employer to compel employees to join a 
union which is not the representative of the majority of the employees. 
To this extent, the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts to enjoin such 
picketing, although it constitutes a violation of the Cox-Phillips Act, 
is curtailed. Clear also is the Supreme Court's dictum that "mass 
• Acts of 1950, c. 452. 
• G.L., c. 149, §20C(e)(I). 
• Id. §20C(e)(3). 
§16.2. 1 Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.s. 
485,74 Sup. Ct. 161,98 L. Ed. 228 (1953). 
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picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and highways 
or picketing homes" may be enjoined by the states (although mass 
picketing and violence by a union affecting employees are also viola-
tive of the Taft-Hartley Act) because the states have traditionally and 
historically exercised police powers to prevent breaches of the peace, to 
maintain public safety and order, and to regulate the use of highways 
and streets. To this extent the equitable jurisdiction of Massachusetts 
courts in labor disputes is confirmed. 
Not so clear from the decision is the jurisdiction of Massachusetts 
courts to enjoin strikes or picketing, defined as unlawful labor disputes 
under the Cox-Phillips Act, arising out of a demand (1) that the em-
ployer commit a criminal offense or violate the Massachusetts anti-
discrimination law, or (2) that the employer include in a collective 
bargaining agreement any provision the execution or performance of 
which would be unlawful. And what is the status of a strike or picket-
ing in violation of the no-strike clause of a collective bargaining agree- f 
ment? The conduct described is not specifically a union unfair labor 
practice under the Taft-Hartley Act, although under some circum-
stances it conceivably could be. On the other hand, this type of con-
duct would not generally be protected concerted activity under Section 
7 of the NLRA. Only the future will determine (1) whether such 
union conduct is to be considered as "governable by the State or it is 
entirely ungoverned," in which case the Supreme Court of the United 
States asserts in the Garner decision that it declines to find an implied 
exclusion of state powers; or (2) whether picketing not falling within 
the specific prohibition of the Taft-Hartley Act is beyond state re-
straint on the theory later expressed in the same opinion that "it is im-
plicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of labor 
to use the weapon of picketing" (except where prohibited by the federal 
act) and the states may not "impinge on the area of labor combat de-
signed to be free." 2 
In a decision 3 since Garner the Supreme Court affirmed the juris-
diction of a state court in a civil action for damages against tortious con-
duct of a union, thus emphasizing the fact that Garner relates only to 
equitable relief. 
§16.3. Narrowing of NLRB jurisdiction. The broad jurisdiction 
of the National Labor Relations Act brings within the NLRB's power 
all business "affecting" interstate commerce. While the Board has 
always asserted the right to decline to exercise its full jurisdiction when 
as a matter of policy it determines that the exercise of jurisdiction 
would not effectuate the policies of the act, the Board has until recently 
generally pursued a policy of exercising wide jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, it has taken jurisdiction of laundries, automobile agencies, taxi-
cabs, local transit lines, and some retail stores. On July 15, 1954, the 
Board issued a statement setting forth in detail a new list of juris-
2346 U.S. at 500,74 Sup. Ct. at 171,98 L. Ed. at 244 (1953). 
• United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 
Sup. Ct. 833, 98 L. Ed. 1025 (1954). 
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dictional criteria 1 which has removed hundreds of companies from 
Board jurisdiction. In Massachusetts, the effect is to bring these em-
ployers and unions within the scope of the Massachusetts Labor Re-
lations Act.2 Furthermore, these employers would seem to have an 
equitable remedy in the state courts against union conduct unlawful 
under the Cox-Phillips Act, since the Garner decision would not appear 
to be applicable in such a situation. Although questions have been 
raised in some quarters to the effect that if a company is within the juris-
diction of the NLRA, the Board's declination to exercise jurisdiction 
creates a no-man's land in which the state still cannot act because of the 
Garner case, it is more probable that a company which is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the NLRA but over which the Board declines to take 
jurisdiction under its amended policy will be fully subject to the labor 
laws of Massachusetts. The State Labor Relations Act is by its terms 
inapplicable to any unfair labor practice governed exclusively by the 
NLRA unless the NLRB has declined jurisdiction.3 
B. THE SLICHTER ACT AMENDMENTS 
§16.4. Background of the act. A law relative to the "peaceful settle-
ment of industrial disputes dangerous to the public health and safety" 
was enacted in Massachusetts in 1947.1 This law is commonly referred 
to as the Slichter Act because its enactment was recommended by a 
special committee, appointed by the Governor, of which Professor 
Sumner H. Slichter of the Harvard Business School was the chairman. 
§16.3. 1 NLRB Press Release R-449, 34 Lab. ReI. Rep. 261 (1954). These standards 
eliminate all public restaurants and create various specific dollar criteria as a basis 
for taking jurisdiction of retail stores, public utility and transit systems, interstate 
trucking firms, multistate enterprises, service establishments, suppliers, manu-
facturers, and national defense contractors. For example, a small manufacturing 
plant in Massachusetts would no longer be subject to NLRB jurisdiction if its direct 
out-of-state shipments are less than $50,000 a year and its annual intrastate sales 
which become part of the stream of interstate commerce amount to less than $100,000. 
NLRB jurisdiction will no longer be exercised over a company solely because it is 
operating under a franchise from a national enterprise or over an office building 
solely because the tenants thereof are subject to Board jurisdiction. 
2 There is a decision in New York to the effect that the New York Labor Relations 
Board has no jurisdiction in a case affecting interstate commerce, even though the 
NLRB has declined jurisdiction, unless there is a formal cession of jurisdiction by 
the NLRB to the state agency (and there has been none). New York State Labor 
Relations Board v. Wags Transportation System, 130 N.Y.S.2d 731, 33 L.R.R.M. 2855 
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1954). The Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, on 
the other hand, takes jurisdiction of any case affecting interstate commerce if it is 
within the area within which the NLRB declines jurisdiction. This practice has 
not yet been finally tested in the courts of Massachusetts. The United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit made it clear in Almeida Bus Lines v. Curran, 209 
F.2d 680, 33 L.R.R.M. 2409 (1954), that the issue of the Massachusetts Labor Rela-
tions Commission's jurisdiction is litigable in the courts of Massachusetts in the first 
instance and not in the lower federal courts. 
3 G.L., c. 150A, §10 (b). 
§16.4. 1 G.L., c. 150".--- J T u a 
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The act covers only industrial disputes in which the distribution of 
food, fuel, water, electric light and power, gas, and hospital and medical 
services are involved. 
The basic provisions of the 1947 law, which remain unchanged, may 
be briefly summarized. In the event that a labor dispute threatens a 
substantial interruption in the production or distribution of essential 
goods or services which the Governor finds creates an emergency, he 
may invoke either or both of the following procedures: (I) he may 
appoint a moderator, who endeavors to persuade the parties to submit 
the dispute to arbitration, or (2) he may appoint an emergency board, 
to which the parties are requested (but not required) to submit the dis-
pute for a recommended settlement. A strike is prohibited during the 
course of these procedures. 
If these procedures fail, or if the Governor determines that they can-
not be applied, he may (I) seize the plant or facilities, or (2) make 
arrangements with either or both of the parties for continued operation 
of the facilities. If no emergency board was appointed prior to the 
seizure, the Governor may appoint a board after seizure and put its rec-
ommendations into effect. If there was a pre-seizure board which made 
recommendations not accepted by the parties, the Governor may put 
such recommendations in effect after seizure. Strikes during the period 
of seizure are unlawful. Seizure ends when the parties have settled 
their dispute or the Governor determines that the emergency has termi-
nated. 
§16.5. Proposals for amendment. At the 1953 convention of the 
Massachusetts Federation of Labor, a resolution was passed urging 
the repeal of the Slichter Act. This stemmed from the invocation of the 
act by the Governor in several cases, one of which involved the milk 
distributing industry. The AFL filed a bill (Senate No. 332 (1954» 
designed to repeal the act. The Greater Boston Chamber of Com-
merce, through its counsel John J. Roddy, also presented a bill (House 
No. 1684 (1954» which proposed a number of amendments designed to 
clarify and improve the act. The Governor proposed two amendments 
in his Annual Message in 1954 and submitted a bill (House No. 2437 
(1954» designed to broaden the power of moderators and permit labor 
and management to choose their representatives on the emergency 
board under the act. After hearings on these bills, the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Industries, of which Senator C. Henry Glovsky was 
chairman, proposed a new bill incorporating features of House No. 
1684 and House No. 2437 along with several new proposals. This com-
mittee bill was introduced after consultation with representatives of all 
interested groups and Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard Law 
School, who had drafted the original act.1 The committee bill was 
enacted.2 The constructiveness of the legislation is indicated by the 
fact that not only did representatives of business associations support 
§16.5. 1 Among others consulted were Professor Sumner H. Slichter, Robert Segal, 
Counsel for the Massachusetts Federation of Labor, and the author. 
2 Acts of 1954, c. 557. 
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the bill finally enacted, but labor generally approved it. For example, 
the AFL's legislative agent in his convention report stated that while the 
changes were "not nearly as comprehensive as desired by the Fed-
eration, they will improve the existing statute." 3 
§16.6. Governor's action; Hearing before declaring an emergency; 
Partial seizures. The Governor is now directed to hold an informal 
hearing (unless he deems it impracticable) before he invokes the act.! 
At this hearing, which is held before the Governor, the Commissioner 
of Labor and Industries, and the Commissioner of Public Safety, the 
parties to the dispute will have the right to be heard upon the sole 
issue of whether an emergency is involved. Under the original pro-
visions of the act the Governor could invoke it on the certification of 
the Commissioner of Labor and Industries. 
The section of the statute permitting the Governor to seize the plant 
or facility is amended 2 to permit partial seizure as well as full seizure. 
§16.7. Moderator's action; Reviewing the merits. A moderator ap-
pointed by the Governor may now review the merits of the dispute and 
act as mediator or conciliator to the extent he deems appropriate, in 
addition to urging the parties to submit the dispute to arbitration.! 
Formerly, the statute prohibited the moderator from reviewing the 
merits of the dispute. In making public his findings as to the responsi-
bility of either or both of the parties for failure to agree to arbitrate, 
he still may express no opinion on the merits of the dispute itself. 
§16.8. Emergency board procedure clarified. The nature and de-
tails of the emergency board procedure are clarified.! The old law re-
ferred to the board as an "emergency board of arbitration" although 
actually it was a mediation board since its recommendations were not 
binding on the parties. The new designation of the board is "emer-
gency board of inquiry." The emergency board is now to consist of one 
member designated by the employer, one member designated by the 
union, and a third impartial member, to represent the general public, 
to be selected by the other two members, or by the Governor if the 
other two members have not selected the third member within seventy-
two hours. The new provisions make it clear that the board's rec-
ommendations are not binding on either party unless that party ac-
cepts such recommendations. There is a new time schedule for the 
board's procedures. 
§16.9. Post-seizure board. The nature of the post-seizure board is 
clarified. Under the old law it was called "a special board of three 
arbitrators," although its recommendations were not binding on the 
• 1954 Annual Report of Massachusetts Federation of Labor (Executive Council 
and Officers) 37. 
§16.6. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 557, §l. 
2 Id. §4. 
§16.7. 1 Acts of 1954. c. 557. §l. 
§16.8. 1 Acts of 19!)4. c. :;">7, ~l. 
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Commonwealth since the Governor was granted discretion as to whether 
he would put the board's recommendations into effect. The board is 
now called a "special commission." It is to be composed of "not less 
than three nor more than six members designated either to represent 
the general public or with equal numbers to represent industry, labor 
and the public, but in the latter event the governor before appointing 
the members of such commission shall request the employer to recom-
mend the members to represent industry and the representatives of the 
employees to recommend the members to represent labor." 1 
The standards which the special commission is to use in making its 
recommendations are changed.2 The old law said that the recom-
mendations would be based on "the conditions in existence in the in-
dustry affected." The new law directs the commission to base its 
findings "on such of the factors normally taken into account in col-
lective bargaining or voluntary arbitration as it deems material, in-
cluding the conditions in the industry affected." 
c. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
§16.10. Court decisions. In 1954 the Supreme Judicial Court de-
cided two cases of importance under the Massachusetts Employment Se-
curity Act. In the first 1 the Court ruled that a finding of the Division 
of Employment Security, to the effect that an employee had been dis-
charged for deliberate misconduct and hence was ineligible for benefits, 
was not supported by the evidence, since the sole evidence to support the 
finding, introduced at the hearing through the company's personnel di-
rector, was hearsay which was not corroborated by other evidence. In 
the second case 2 it was held that the board of review in the Employ-
ment Security Division may consider all aspects of a claimant's eligi-
bility for benefits and is not limited to points raised in the appeal. It 
was further held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding of 
ineligibility where the inference could be drawn that the unemployed 
worker had limited her availability for work to employment equally as 
desirable as a former employment. 
§16.11. Legislation. The 1954 legislature amended the Employ-
ment Security Act (I) by increasing the amount of weekly benefits for 
each dependent child from $2 to $3,1 (2) by requiring that employers 
supply employees with statements of earnings under certain circum-
stances,2 and (3) by providing that an employee otherwise entitled to 
§16.9. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 557, §4. 
• Ibid. 
§16.l0. 1 Sinclair v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 1954 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. Ill, ll7 N.E.2d 164. 
• Pizura v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309. 
llB N.E.2d 771. 
§16.11. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 639. 
• Id., c. 655. 
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benefits will not have the amount of benefits reduced by reason of part-
time earnings up to $10 per week earned while drawing benefits.3 In 
other words, an employee may still draw maximum benefits of $25 per 
week plus dependency benefits and still earn up to $10 per week in other 
part-time employment provided such earnings and benefits do not ex-
ceed the employee's average weekly wages. 
3 Id., c. 673. 
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